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Yannis Tsantoulis 
Subregionalism in the Black Sea 
and the EU’s Role 
Incentives, Obstacles and a ‘New Synergy’ 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation and Objectives 
The rationale that lies behind the choice of the wider Black Sea region as a 
case study is basically twofold and is primarily driven by challenges. The 
first reason is related to current geopolitical trends. Given the prominent 
list of regional and external players, the Black Sea as a crossroads and an 
area of – and in – transition is characterised by a high degree of geopoliti-
cal pluralism and thus is considered to be above all geostrategic in nature 
and an area where geopolitical competitions might flare.
1 The enlargement 
of the European Union (EU) – and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) at the same time – towards the Black Sea comes to reveal the 
importance of the region as these parallel moves implied the removal of the 
divisions of the Cold War from the heartland of the European continent to 
 
1   For a detailed – and to a certain degree prophetical – overview of the geopolitics in 
the region see: Brzezinski, Zbigniev, The Grand Chessboard, New York: Basic 
Books, 1997. The author describes the mega-continent of Eurasia as a chessboard 
on which the struggle/game for world power and hegemony will take place. Ten 
years later it is interesting to read his comments on the geopolitical gravity of the 
wider Black Sea region albeit he prefers to use another term, i.e. Eurasian Balkans, 
southern part of Eurasia etc. Yannis Tsantoulis 
4   
its periphery. Moreover, these shifts proved to be key components in a 
broader process that fundamentally altered the security architecture of 
Europe and consequently its political geography.
2 Also, the fact that the 
region is becoming – in economic terms (e.g. trade, investments, new mar-
kets) – increasingly attractive enhances the argument that the EU should 
boost its role in the region and foster a dynamic and coherent policy. How-
ever, the lack of resolution of the ‘frozen conflicts’ in the region, the co-
nundrums posed by energy security issues and the involvement of key 
external actors constitute a rather complicated geopolitical puzzle.  
The second reason for the choice of this region, as a case study, lies in the 
fact that the study of the Black Sea has been a largely neglected phenome-
non within the discipline of international relations. The entire region has 
been divided among the studies of the Balkans, Middle East and the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS); thus no regional dynamic was 
taken into consideration.
3 In many ways, the Black Sea region has been the 
‘Bermuda Triangle of Western strategic studies’
4. Lying at the crossroads 
of European, Eurasian and Middle Eastern security spaces, it has been in 
principal ignored or even mistreated by experts in each of these faculties. 
Geographically located at the edge of each region, it has not been at the 
centre of attention of any of them. 
Charles King, in his seminal work, supports the argument that for entire 
stretches of the Black Sea’s history there have been no more than a few 
specialist monographs.
5 Moreover, the question of ‘European’ identity – 
understood in terms of a cultural and civilisational homeland – also pro-
vides a compelling reasoning for the ‘peculiarities’ of the region and thus 
 
2   Cornell, Svante,  Jonsson, Anna,  Nilsson, Niklas and Häggström, Per, “The Wider 
Black Sea Region: An Emerging Hub in European Security”, Silk Road Paper, Cen-
tral Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic 
Research and Policy Center, December 2006, p. 13. 
3   Georgiev, Adrian, “The Black Sea Region – EU’s Black Sea Region policies and 
Bulgaria’s potential contribution”, MA Thesis, College of Europe, Bruges Campus, 
Academic Year 2005-2006, p. 10.  
4   This term can be found in: Asmus, Ronald, “Developing a New Euro-Atlantic Strat-
egy for the Black Sea Region”, Istanbul Paper No. 2, German Marshall Fund, p. 1. 
5   King, Charles, The Black Sea – A History, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 4. Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role 
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for the difficulties in approaching it. Milan Kundera captured the essence 
of Central Europe as the West’s ‘vital centre of gravity’
6. However, unlike 
‘Central Europe’ the Black Sea region has always provided the canvas 
upon which competition over divergent paths to Europe and Asia has 
stretched.
7 Thus, from an academic point of view, one of the ‘hidden’ chal-
lenges of this thesis is the attempt to approach the Black Sea as a Unit of 
Analysis with its own regional and geopolitical dynamics. 
With these considerations in mind, the main objectives of this Discussion 
Paper are, first of all, to define the wider Black Sea Region in terms of his-
tory, geography and current geopolitics. However, this is not an easy task. 
As Aydin stresses, there are many analysts who question whether the Black 
Sea area is a region at all, arguing that it is not seen as such from the out-
side (by the international community), nor from the inside (by the Black 
Sea countries themselves).
8 Furthermore, Valinakis claims that the term 
‘Black Sea area (or region)’ has been used in the literature in a rather flexi-
ble way
9 and Roberts simply argues that defining the Black Sea region is 
still a ‘matter of taste’
10. Also, the various terms (Mare Maggiore and Mare 
Maius – the Great Sea, Pontos Axeinos – the dark or somber Sea, Pontus 
Euxinus – the welcoming sea, Kara Deniz – the dark forbidding Sea among 
others) used over the long course of history reveal the ‘uniqueness’ of this 
sea. Nevertheless, as it will be shown in the subsequent chapters all the re-
 
6   Regarding the significance of identities see: Neumann, Iver, “European Identity, EU 
Expansion and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus”, Alternatives, Vol. 23, 1998, pp. 
379-416 and Kundera, Milan, “The tragedy of Central Europe”, New York Review 
of Books, 26 April 1984, pp. 33-38. 
7   Herd, Graeme and Moustakis, Fotios, “Black Sea Geopolitics: Dilemmas, Obstacles 
& Prospects”, G-84, Conflict Studies Research Centre, July 2000, pp. 8-9. 
8   Aydin, Mustafa, “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and the role of Institu-
tions”, Perceptions, Autumn 2005, pp. 59-60. 
9    Valinakis, Yannis, “The Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Europe”, Chaillot Paper, No. 36, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1999, p. 6. 
10  Roberts, John, “The Black Sea and European Energy Security”, Journal of South-
east European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2006, p. 222. Yannis Tsantoulis 
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gions are to some extend subjectively defined and can thus be understood, 
as Adler has remarked, as ‘cognitive regions’.
11  
The second objective of this thesis is to analyse the policies of the EU to-
wards the region by emphasizing the policy failures of the past and the op-
portunities and challenges for the future. The third objective is to 
demonstrate the sudden emergence of the Black Sea region into the zone of 
interest and influence of the EU – and of other key external actors at the 
same time – and also to reveal the obstacles towards enhanced cooperation 
that stem from various factors. Last but certainly not least, the most ambi-
tious part of this thesis is to propose some guidelines for a new EU driven 
strategy towards the region.  
2. Defining the Wider Black Sea Region 
2.1. The history of the Black Sea World – A Historical Unit of Analy-
sis?  
The historical evolution of the wider Black Sea region is very much re-
flected by the developments that bind it at present: A veritable mélange of 
ethnic, religious, economic and political factors bond past and present with 
audacity and persistence. A mélange of lifestyles, customs and people that 
for a long time swirled around the shores. Why is this region – if it is one – 
the way it is?  
In a historical perspective, it has moved from the centre to the periphery of 
the Western World and vice versa 
12 while at the same time it has been go-
ing through periods of Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Russian and Ottoman 
 
11  Adler, Emanuel, ‘Imagined (Security) Communities’, Paper presented at 1994 An-
nual Meeting of the American Political Science Meeting, New York, 1-4 September 
1994.  
12  From Marco Polo’s famous work Le divisament dou monde (The Description of the 
world) until Mark Twain’s writings and up to now to Charles King’s work on the 
region, one could see the ambivalent relationship of the region with the West. A 
good example is the story of the city of Odessa, i.e. from a trade center to a dusty 
Tartar village, then from a European city “as any other European capital” to a city 
dominated by the USSR.    Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role 
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dominance. Thus, there has been a constant flow of new conquerors, but 
always stopped around the Sea, which in turn shaped common traits to the 
region.
13 After centuries, and more specifically in the 18th century, the 
whole region was again beginning to be known for its divisions, turmoil 
and confrontations, while Western Europe was discovering the notions of 
peace and cooperation among nations.
14 Later on, in the 19th century, the 
Black Sea lay at the heart of the “Eastern question” and the dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire. Between the two world wars, the area stood at the in-
tersection of the turbulent Balkan Peninsula, Russia and European protec-
torates. Later on the countries of the region were on the front line in the 
global struggle between capitalism and communism, either as mavericks 
(Albania, Yugoslavia and Romania) or as the vanguard (Greece and Tur-
key) of the West against the Soviet Union. Since the end of communism, 
South-East Europe, King concludes in his analysis, has become “a region 
of risky political transitions and relatively poor states, a ‘worrying lacuna’ 
in EU’s vision of creating a united and prosperous neighbourhood.”
15 
2.2. Geography and geopolitics of the Wider Black Sea Region 
The Black Sea region is a distinct geographical area rich in natural re-
sources and strategically located at the junction of Europe, Central Asia 
and the Middle East where geographical coordinates play an essential role 
in the examination of the region. Aydin argues that, the usage of the term 
‘Black Sea Region/Area’ exceeds the simple political and geographical bar-
riers and refers to a vast region stretching from South Eastern Europe into 
the Western shores of Caspian Sea. There are geo-strategic, economic, and 
socio-political reasons to link the ‘Black Sea’ area (in the strict geographi-
cal sense, consisting only of six littoral states) with the wider geographic 
areas of the Caucasus, the Caspian, and the Balkans.
16 
 
13  Georgiev, op.cit., pp. 14-17. 
14   Bordonaro, Federico, “Bulgaria, Romania and the Changing Structure of the Black 
Sea's Geopolitics”, The Power and Interest News Report (PINR), 2005. Available 
at: http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=302 , 04.01.2008.  
15  King, op.cit., pp. 5-6. 
16  Aydin, op.cit., pp. 58-61.  Yannis Tsantoulis 
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In this sense, as a geopolitical construct rather than a simple geographical 
space, the wider Black Sea region includes riparian states and adjacent 
states that are affected by and affect developments across this broad area.
17 
Although there is no doubt that South-East Europe, the Black Sea, the Cau-
casus and the Caspian are separate regions in the turbulent post-Soviet 
Eurasia, with different political dynamics and plenty of internal diversity 
and conflicts, the working definition of the ‘Black Sea region’
18 used in this 
paper, has a value as an outline for unfolding and amplifying the complex-
ity of this dynamic area. Nevertheless, as Jean Dufourq argues, it should be 
borne in mind that notwithstanding the utilitarian viewpoint, the usefulness 
of the “Wider Black Sea” concept remains to be seen. It is believed that the 
development of this geopolitical space is hampered at present by the ab-
sence of any real regional leadership and littoral state solidarity, as well as 
by lack of determined commitment by external actors, both states and insti-
tutions.
19 
2.3. The Black Sea in the New Geopolitical Context – Searching for 
a New Role, a New Identity. 
The strategic reopening of the Black Sea after the end of the Cold War is 
far from complete. However, if positive political and economic evolutions 
 
17  Aydin, Mustafa, “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea Area and its Integration 
into Euro-Atlantic Structures” in The Role of the Wider Black Sea Area in a Future 
European Security Space, Occasional Paper, Vol. 1, NATO Defence College, Re-
search Branch, Rome, December 2005,  pp. 31-32. 
18  The wider Black Sea region includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova in 
the West, Ukraine and Russia in the North, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 
East and Turkey in the South. Though Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece 
are not littoral states, history, proximity and close ties make them natural regional 
actors. It should be mentioned that I adopt the approach of the European Commis-
sion (COM 2007, (2007), 160 final) and of other scholars (i.e Aydin et. al.) towards 
the geography of the region for a variety of reasons and hereinafter terms like Black 
Sea World, Black Sea region or simple “region” will always refer to the Wider 
Black Sea region as defined here.  
19  Dufourq, Jean, “Introduction”, The Role of the Wider Black Sea Area in a Future 
European Security Space, Occasional Paper, Vol. 1, NATO Defence College, Re-
search Branch, Rome, December 2005, p. 7 Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role 
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continue, the Black Sea region could become a part of a new strategic con-
cept.
20  
However, within this context, there is no single locus of threat but a com-
plex picture of hot spots, associated weaknesses and growing instabilities. 
Four main processes could be considered the basis for a new strategic con-
cept for the Black Sea area:  
1.  the enlargement of the EU and of NATO, the changing risk percep-
tions after 11 September along with the ‘frozen conflicts’,  
2.  the redrawing of the energy map with the building of new oil and gas 
pipelines,  
3.  the complicated EU- Russian and EU-Turkey rapprochement and 
4.  the redefinition of the relations among the states of the region. 
2.4. Defining a region from different theoretical angles 
As the ‘Cold War’ balance of power came to an end and as the process of 
globalization affects the current delicate balance of power, new regional 
schemes emerged and multi-dimensional exchanges intensified on a re-
gional scale. Thus, the reality of the contemporary world seems to be also 
expressed in terms of regionalism. In other words, power, authorities and 
competences traditionally attributed to states seem increasingly to be ex-
pressed through regional constructions in which the nation state, in its tra-
ditional Westphalian form, is now embedded.
21   
Nonetheless, post Cold War developments have also raised conceptual 
problems about how to define a region. Many argue that geographical prox-
imity, common history and a sense of community is a good start for this 
intellectual endeavour. Others go even further by defining a region as being 
“a group of states whose primary security concerns link together suffi-
 
20  NATO is already involved in energy security issues and the safety of infrastructure. 
There is also a thought that NATO Respond Forces might be also deployed for the 
energy security interests of the EU in case of an emergency.  
21  Telo, Mario, (eds.), European Union and New Regionalism - Regional Actors and 
global governance in a post-hegemonic era, Ashgate, England, 2001, p. xiii. Yannis Tsantoulis 
10   
ciently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be consid-
ered apart from one another”
22 while others define a region as “a function 
of rising or declining hegemonies” or as “a localism-oriented gathering 
against the pressures of globalization”.
23  
Indeed, in the International Relations literature, no standard definition of 
‘region’ exists and the term ‘region’ has many different connotations and 
interpretations both in scholarly and popular parlance. Actually, there are 
many who still argue that a region can be anything ranging from an area 
within a single state to a whole continent. For example, Nye in 1968, ar-
gued that: “Regions are what politicians and people want them to be”.
 24 
This ambiguity is also reflected in how associated/correlated terms such as 
‘regionalism’ and ‘subregionalism’, ‘region building’, ‘regionalisation’ 
‘regionness’ are used in the literature.
25 In this sense, Hettne is right by ar-
guing that this overproduction of concepts signals a certain disarray and 
thus produces also ontological and epistemological problems.
 26 Many at-
tributes have been presented to depict regions including elements such as 
geographical proximity; internal and external recognition as distinctive 
area; the number of members; a regional equilibrium of local forces; ‘social 
and cultural homogeneity’
27, ‘regional awareness and the identity’
28, but 
 
22  Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Stud-
ies for the Post-Cold War World, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 190. 
23   Walt, Stephen, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 
1987. 
24  Nye, Joseph, (eds.) International Regionalism, Boston, Little Brown, 1968, p.VI-
VII. 
25  The proliferation of groupings like Central European Initiative (CEI) and Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) among others has prompted some scholars to coin 
the term ‘subregionalism’ in order to distinguish them from larger integration pro-
jects, most notably the EU. 
26  Hettne, Björn, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism”, New Political Economy, Volume 
10, Number 4, December 2005, Routledge, London, pp.543-571.   
27  Russett, Bruce “Delineating International Regions”, in Singer, David (eds.) Quanti-
tative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, New York, Free Press, 1968, pp. 
317-352.  
28  Russell, Andrew “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” 
Review of International Studies 21, 1995, pp. 333-338.  Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role 
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still a consensus in the studies of regional integration is not on the hori-
zon.
29 
2.5. The Case of the Wider Black Sea Region 
Some of the above-mentioned definitions could be applied to the Black Sea 
region. Definitely, geographical proximity and the presence of regional 
groupings are key elements. However, other elements such as shared social 
features might be questionable, since the Black Sea’s diversity of cultures, 
religions, and political allegiances could be seen as obstacles to the emer-
gence of a distinct community or of a single, politically and socially shared 
identity. Actually, various studies in the region reveal that there is little 
evidence of a sense of belonging to the Black Sea region.
30 Moreover, the 
countries of the wider Black Sea region often do not view themselves as a 
distinct geographic entity.
31 Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons 
which have hindered the meaningful development of a Black Sea regional 
consciousness or self-perception and might act as barriers and in the near 
future. These are:  
1.  the geopolitical legacies, occasionally involving regional rivalries 
(Greece-Turkey, Russia-Turkey etc.),  
2.  the differing economic performances and levels of standards of liv-
ing, and perhaps most importantly 
 
29  Thompson, William, “The Regional Subsystem. A Conceptual Explication and a 
Propositional Inventory”, International Studies Quarterly, 17.1, 1973, pp. 89-117 
and Cantori, Louis and Spiegel, Steven, The International Politics of Regions: A 
Comparative Approach, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 6. 
30  IREX report, Regionalism, Sub-regionalism and Security in the Black Sea Region, 
IREX Black and Caspian Sea Collaborative Research Program, 2004. Available at: 
http://harvard-bssp.org/publications/?id=146, 12.04.2006.   
31  Maybe, it could be useful to distinguish two micro-regions with the wider Black Sea 
region. Namely, a core one including the littoral states and a peripheral consisting 
of the neighbouring ones.  Yannis Tsantoulis 
12   
3.  the differing supranational/intergovernmental affiliations and na-
tional political priorities although in the recent past there have been 
some signs of rapprochement.
32  
At the end of the day, the states of the region appear not to possess a com-
mon regional identity, namely what people, politicians and governments 
make out of it.  
Notwithstanding this forceful reduction in the heterogeneity of the region, 
it is remarkable to find even today the great ethnic mosaics of the past. 
Each of the Black Sea region countries is a rich mixture of peoples of all 
over the Black Sea. The common past and those shared civilisations are and 
could be a ‘region-forming factor’. Sharing a common territory for centu-
ries inevitably leads to the acquisition of related “civilisational traits, men-
tality, and treat reality”
33. Furthermore, it could be argued that the years of 
communism have created a common mentality, as far as the entire Black 
Sea region, except Turkey and Greece, was under Soviet rule fifty and sev-
enty years.  
For those reasons, the Black Sea region might be considered as an ideal 
multicultural laboratory. The Black Sea geo-cultural region has its own par-
ticular characteristics (e.g. different religions, customs, languages) which 
give the Black Sea region an important place on the cultural scene of 
Europe.
34 One might agree with King’s argument that, “what is happening 
these days is the unearthing of a forgotten system of relationships, a filigree 
of human links, which were hidden under the layers of communism and 
post-communism”.
35 
 
32  Gavras, Panayotis, “The Black Sea and the European Union”: Developing Relations 
and Expanding Institutional Links”, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies, Vo. 4 Number 1, Frank Cass, London, January 2004, p. 27. 
33  Parakhonskiy Boris, “The Black Sea-Caspian region in the European context: New 
landmarks of security and cooperation”, in: Journal of Social and Political Studies, 
Institute for Central Asian and Caucasian Studies, 2003.  
34  BSEC Business Council, Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation, Bulgargas 
Joins Bourgas-Alexandroupolis, BSEC BC business news. Available at:   
http://www.bsec-business.org/news.asp?newsid=72, 05.01.2008. 
35  King, op.cit., p.6. Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role 
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Beyond the neorealists, the neo-functionalists and the intergovernmentalists 
(all of them with a strong explanatory power vis-á-vis the phenomenon of 
regional integration), the contribution of the constructivists is exactly the 
idea that geopolitical identities change over time and that defining others 
and drawing borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is a key step in the articula-
tion of identities, whether national or regional.
36  
3. The EU’s Policy Towards the Region 
3.1. Why was the wider Black Sea region neglected in the past? 
The Black Sea was for a long time treated as the ‘black hole’ of Eurasia. 
Why was that the case? First, as mentioned before, in many ways the wider 
Black Sea region has been the ‘Bermuda Triangle’ of Western strategic 
studies. Second, given the crowded agenda of the European Union since the 
collapse of communism, there was little time or political energy left to ad-
dress coherently the wider Black Sea region. There was also little push 
from the region and from the EU as well for a closer relationship. As As-
mus and Jackson cynically remark, in the Western world, there is always a 
tendency to ignore or neglect problems for which one has no immediate 
answer or prospect for success: the ‘too hard to handle’ category.
37  
Moreover, the Black Sea has been a ‘civilisational black hole’ in the Euro-
pean historical consciousness. Europe proved to suffer not only from a lack 
of familiarity with the region, its people, its problems, its rich culture, and 
its contribution to the spread of Western civilization, but also from a kind 
of historical amnesia. For some, Europe meant Western Europe; for others, 
it extended to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, but in the case of the latter, 
only to its western and southern edges.
38 Furthermore, the emergence of the 
‘frozen conflicts’ in the Black Sea region contributed to the isolation of the 
 
36  Bechen, Dimitar, “Contested Borders, Contested Identity: The Case of Regionalism 
in Southeast Europe”, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 4 
Number 1, Frank Cass, London, January 2004, p. 84. 
37  Asmus and Jackson, op. cit. pp.1-4. 
38  Ibid. Yannis Tsantoulis 
14   
region.
39 This state of affairs continued throughout the 1990’s. Also, an im-
portant point is that, the Black Sea countries still lack strong lobbyists and 
thus influence in the formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
within the institutions of the European Union is limited.
40  
Besides that, the divergence of policy approaches in regards to the relations 
with Russia is also an important parameter. There is a group of countries 
that for a number of reasons want to maintain excellent relations with Rus-
sia, whereas other countries adopt a different approach.
41 
3.2. The Failure of the ‘Old’ EU Policies/Initiatives  
Unfortunately, the EU lacked in the past a coherent strategy for the Black 
Sea region. During the 1990s, EU’s ‘foreign policy’ – if this is the appro-
priate term – revolved around the question of membership/non-
membership. To put it bluntly, if membership was on the table, then the EU 
had a fully developed policy towards a given state, but if it was not, then 
the EU had little policy at all. One could argue that during the 1990s the 
Black Sea was too far away and too messy for the EU, and too close and 
important for Russia. In any case, it is relatively difficult to talk of an EU 
policy towards the conflicts in the region in the 1990s. There was virtually 
none. The EU has been involved in the Black Sea region mainly through 
 
39  SIPRI Seminar report, “The Black Sea as Boundary or Bridge? Implications of EU 
and NATO enlargement, and the Regional Security”, International Peace Research 
Institute, Stockholm, 28 November 2003, p.11.  
40  However, that seems to change if someone reads the recent Documents of the Euro-
pean Commission. 
41  For instance, according to the EU-Observer, Greece and Cyprus are often regarded 
as ‘Trojan horses’ for Russia. Germany, France, Italy and Spain are seen as strategic 
partners for Russia. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Portugal are put into a ‘friendly pragmatic’ category. 
The Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Romania and the United Kingdom are considered to be ‘frosty pragmatic’, critical 
of Russia but still prepared to do business with it. On the other hand Lithuania and 
Poland are the ‘new Cold-Warriors’. For further information see 
http://euobserver.com/24/25101, 19.12.2007. Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role 
 15
economical cooperation and technical assistance.
42 The EU coordinated its 
national foreign policies on a case by case basis without any collective co-
herence.
43 A typical example is the vital issue of energy the policy. The EU 
was – and still is – driven by national governments and ‘national elites’ as 
well. 
4. EU’s Interests and Challenges in the region  
4.1. Identifying the Need to Act 
Yves Lacoste, the famous French geographer and geopolitician, has re-
marked that during the last decades the most important geopolitical and 
geostrategic transformations did not take place on land, but happened in the 
atmosphere and at sea.
44 This affirmation is also true for the wider Black 
Sea region. Neglecting the Black Sea region is not an option anymore for 
the EU. The expansion of the EU to Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and at 
a later stage – at least – a privileged partnership with Turkey, will make 
50% of the Black Sea coastline making up the EU, with more than 50% of 
the coastal population of the Black Sea.
45 Within this context, the inclusion 
of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to the extended European Neighbour-
hood Policy is of vital importance.
46  
Under these circumstances, there can be spelled out four main reasons 
which make the Black Sea region of significant importance for the EU:  
 
42  SIPRI Seminar report, op.cit., p.12. The main fields of involvement were trans-
boundary ‘soft security’ challenges such as border management, environmental deg-
radation, inter–state infrastructures and trans-boundary crime. 
43  For instance; France co-presides the Minsk Group, Germany is involved in solving 
the conflict in Abkhazia while Britain appointed Brian Fall as the special represen-
tative for Georgia in 2002 and then for the South-Caucasus. Neorealism constitutes 
the theoretical basis of EU’s policy making, since national interests and balance of 
power are the main elements. 
44  See Lacoste, Yves, “Questions de Geopolitique”, Le livre de poche, Paris, 1991, 
p.117.  
45  Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, Permanent Se-
cretariat. 
46  Ukraine and Moldova were already included and Russia is engaged through a dis-
tinct strategic partnership, the so-called Four Common Spaces. Yannis Tsantoulis 
16   
1.  the frozen conflicts all around the Black Sea and the instability they 
provide;  
2.  the access to the Caspian region energy resources;  
3.  the unintentional encirclement of a part of Russia by the EU; and fi-
nally 
4.  the position of the Black Sea region as neighbour of the Greater 
Middle East or to put it more clearly as a linchpin between core 
Europe and the Middle East.  
4.2. The Challenges and Risks of the ‘Frozen Conflicts’ 
The growing strategic importance of the Black Sea region to the EU is ba-
sically a consequence of EU enlargement. The EU is now a Black Sea ri-
parian power and a regional actor. Transnational issues relating to the 
Black Sea region, that fall within the scope of EU competences, will re-
quire a collective approach and agreed common EU policies. The sense of 
urgency about confronting the new security threats in the wider Black Sea 
region has been growing within the EU, as have been the calls for tackling 
those issues in a trans-Atlantic format.
47 
Indeed, the Black Sea region presents practically all the security challenges 
that characterise the post-Cold War period.
48 The secessionist conflicts in 
the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood are also important tests for the whole web 
of the EU’s bilateral and multilateral relations with all of its Eastern part-
ners. The conflict in Transnistria is a test for EU relations with Moldova, 
Ukraine and Russia. The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are a test 
for EU relations with Georgia and Russia and the Nagorno-Karabakh con-
flict is at the heart of EU relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, but is also 
a factor in EU-Turkey and EU-Russia relations. Popescu is right when he 
 
47  Celac, Sergiu and Vahl, Marius, “Ready for a breakthrough: Elements for a Euro-
pean Union strategy Towards the Black Sea Region” in Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, Vol. 6, No.2, June 2006, pp. 169-191. 
48  That is to say: the transformation of the newly independent states; regional conflicts 
and separatist movements, the difficult process of democratisation; internal and in-Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role 
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argues that the EU can do little in the East without stumbling on these se-
cessionist conflicts.
49 Therefore, the wider Black Sea region figures de 
facto on the EU’s security agenda at a practical level, with the nomination 
of an EU Special Representative for the Caucasus and Moldova
50; and at a 
conceptual level, since the region has been recognised as an area where the 
main tools of the Common and Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are 
typically applicable.
51 It is also interesting to notice that the attention of the 
states is directed more outside the region rather on the region itself or with 
their neighbours.
52 
4.3. Protecting EU’s ‘energy security’ 
4.3.1. Defining Energy Security 
Along with the issue of the ‘frozen conflicts’ comes energy. It is widely 
argued that, issues related to energy security involve primarily, but not ex-
clusively, problems and concerns over the transportation of natural gas and 
crude oil to outside markets. However, this is not exactly the case. Energy 
security also encompasses various technical, legal and environmental as-
pects and this is certainly the case for the Black Sea.
53  
Nowadays, the concept of security is expanded in such a way that it also 
includes political, economic, societal and environmental components in 
 
ternational terrorism; the security of oil and gas pipelines; ecological risks and mas-
sive economic underdevelopment. 
49  Popescu, Nicu, “Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours – The EU in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia”, Working Document, No. 260, CEPS, March 2007, p. 1. 
50  The Council appointed Heikki Talvitie, the European Union Special Representative 
(EUSR) for the South Caucasus on 7 July 2003. The decision was declared to be in 
line with the Council’s wish to play a 'more active political role’ in the region. See 
Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP. 
51  An interesting list of different conceptual frameworks/lenses vis-à-vis the South 
Caucasus can be found in Helly, Damien, “EU Policies in the South Caucasus”, 
Conference – Europe and the South Caucasus, Baku, CERI / Sciences Po, June 
2001, pp. 2-4. 
52  Lynch, David, “A regional insecurity dynamic” in Lynch, David (eds.) “The South 
Caucasus: a challenge for the EU”, Chaillot Paper, Institute for Security Studies, 
December 2003, pp. 9-10. 
53  Winrow, M. Gareth, “Energy Security in the Black Sea – Caspian Region”, Percep-
tions, Autumn 2005, p. 85. Yannis Tsantoulis 
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addition to a military dimension.
54 The term energy security focuses on the 
imperative for governments to secure adequate supplies of energy at af-
fordable prices. Moreover, in order to reduce the vulnerability of a state to 
possible disruptions of energy supplies, the key is the diversification of 
supplies. Indeed, over-dependence might give the comparative advantage 
to an energy supplier to exert political and economic leverage over the en-
ergy consuming state. Furthermore, energy security also concerns the vital 
issue of access to energy since it is important that energy is safely delivered 
through pipelines or by other means of transport. This is a particular prob-
lem in the Black Sea-Caspian region due to the above mentioned unre-
solved and ongoing ethnic conflicts and the increased activities of radical 
Islamic groups in the northern and southern Caucasus. 
4.3.2. The Geopolitics of Energy (Security) of and Around the Black 
Sea 
Within a context of continued instability in the Middle East, volatile energy 
prices and growing concerns about the energy supply, the wider Black Sea 
region, by all accounts, emerges, both as a producer and as a transit area for 
energy, as an ‘energy security hub’. As Lesser puts it, “the Black Sea has 
become a leading theatre in which the new dynamics of energy security are 
being played out, a theatre in which transit countries as much as producing 
countries are leading stakeholders.”
55 From this viewpoint, the main fea-
tures that portray the Black Sea’s geopolitical identity in terms of energy 
are the following: 
1.  First of all, the Black Sea region is in good posture to become a 
channel and a path for energy resources from Azerbaijan, Iran and 
Central Asia. Overall, the energy transit factor of the Black Sea re-
gion should not be underestimated, since oil is not only shipped by 
sea but also transferred through existing pipelines and there also 
other under construction in Ukraine, Russia and Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey and Bulgaria and Greece. Especially, if one takes into 
 
54  Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis, Boulder, Colo and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998. 
55  Lesser, Ian, “Global Trends, Regional Consequences: Wider Strategic Influences on 
the Black Sea”, Xenophon Paper No.4, ICBSS, Athens, November 2007, p. 13. Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role 
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consideration the congestion in the straits of Bosporus and the build-
ing of new bypass pipelines the picture becomes quite clear.  
2.  Second, as Winrow points out, in the Black Sea-Caspian region there 
is a real concern that crude oil and natural gas pipelines running over 
third countries may be sabotaged by rebel groups. Transit states 
could also illegally tap into the pipelines to satisfy their own energy 
needs.
56 
3.  Third, the side-effects of the pipeline projects, since they can stimu-
late economic development and thus spur economic development 
and cooperation in the Caucasus and throughout the Black Sea re-
gion. Most importantly, building pipelines requires high level of re-
gional cooperation and stability, thus promoting from the outside the 
regional cooperation level in the Black Sea region.
57 
4.  Fourth, the opportunity to project stability in Europe’s East and by 
extension to the central part of the Greater Middle East. The Black 
Sea region isn’t seen anymore as the periphery of the European con-
tinent, but is starting to become “a core component of the West’s 
strategic hinterland”.
58 
5.  Fifth, the Black Sea region could also be used as a transport route for 
oil and gas pipelines bypassing Russia. The building of Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) oil and gas pipe-
lines respectively is a typical example. However, once again it 
should be noted that Russia should be treated as a strategic ally for 
the EU. Nevertheless, monopolies and dominant positions in the en-
ergy sectors should be always avoided or at least controlled in ad-
vance. In that sense, bypassing Russian routes is one of the most 
efficient ways to achieve that. 
 
56  Winrow, op.cit., p.89. 
57  Kempe, Iris and Klotzle, Kurt, “The Balkans and the Black Sea Region: Problems, 
Potentials, and Policy Options”, in: Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, Policy 
Analysis, C.A.P., No 2, April 2006. p.9.  
58  Asmus and Jackson, op.cit. Yannis Tsantoulis 
20   
6.  Sixth, it is the increasing competition for energy resources from rap-
idly growing economies in China and India. It is argued that, the 
Black Sea region is set to become a pivotal conduit for non-OPEC, 
non- Persian Gulf, and non-Russian oil and natural gas flowing from 
the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to western markets.
59 
It is quite obvious that, in terms of geography, the attention is onto how oil 
and gas will reach Europe’s major consumer markets. However, in terms of 
politics, the countries of the region have to weigh their domestic energy 
security with their current or prospective roles in ensuring broader regional 
or continental energy security and economically, the Black Sea states may 
be in a position to influence the terms under which oil and gas reach Eu-
rope. Nevertheless, the balance between these different parameters varies 
considerably from country to country and therefore it is even more impor-
tant to assess whether a regional Black Sea identity could be established in 
order to promote the three elements of the energy chain: supplier, transit 
and consumer countries.
60 
4.3.3. The EU’s Drive for Multiple Suppliers 
The EU is clearly looking for multiple supply sources. Commenting on the 
beginning of the construction of the Turkey-Greece pipeline, Loyola de 
Palacio said in January 2004 that the Commission was particularly pleased 
at the outcome of the Turkish-Greek commercial negotiations.
61 Few 
months before the pipelines starts to flow gas from the Caspian and the new 
Commissioner Pielbags has restated and reaffirmed the EU’s satisfaction. 
The EU Green Paper states that “as long as the European Union’s external 
supply of gas depends on 41% of imports from Russia and almost 30% 
from Algeria, geographical diversification of our supplies would appear 
desirable” – although it does go on to add the key phrase ‘particularly in 
 
59  Kempe and Klotzle, op.cit., pp.9-10.   
60  Roberts, op.cit., pp. 207-223. 
61  The exact words were “these [the negotiations] will not only bolster peace and sta-
bility in the region, but it will also make it possible to supply new gas resources 
from the Caspian Basin and Iran to the internal gas market of the Enlarged Euro-
pean Union and to the Balkans thus improving security of supply for all stake-
holders concerned by this infrastructure”, quoted from Palacio, Loyola, “Greece-
Turkey Gas Agreement”, IP/04/71, Brussels, 20 January, 2004. Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role 
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LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas)’. Within this context, Turkey believes that it 
will develop into a conduit through which much of this gas will reach mar-
kets in Europe. Also, it is true that the Nabucco project offers a serious 
prospect for delivering Middle Eastern and Caspian gas to major European 
markets. 
It is quite obvious, that again much depends on Russia’s decision what role 
– cooperative or dominant – it wants to play in terms of acting as both a 
supplier and transit country for gas for the EU. Actually, the EU is cur-
rently seeking to secure an agreement with Russia on the core issue of tran-
sit. The EU’s solution to the monopoly transit powers is straightforward. It 
would like Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty and, in particular, to 
sign up to the Energy Charter Secretariat’s Transit Protocol, which would, 
in essence, open up Russia’s pipeline system to third parties on a transpar-
ent and non-discriminatory basis.  
In general, of course, the fact that the EU, the world’s second largest gas 
consumer, is located next door to Russia, the world’s largest gas producer, 
makes it eminently sensible for the two parties to determine how they can 
best serve each other’s requirements. There is a prospect that the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organisation might yet play a role in either 
resolving the Bosporus bypass issue or in helping to get the Nabucco pro-
ject off the ground. Ambassador Checehlashvili and General Secretary of 
the BSEC said in September 2003: “We’ve presented a platform of Coop-
eration with the European Union; we are trying to develop new infrastruc-
ture and cooperation paving the way for new networks of security”.
62      
5. Ready for a ‘European’ Breakthrough? 
5.1. Europe’s Attitude Towards Subregionalism 
Subregionalism gained momentum in Europe in the early 1990s. After re-
gaining their independence, all the post-Communist countries of the Black 
 
62   Address to the Conference of the International Centre for Black Sea Studies 
(ICBSS), Athens, September 2003. Yannis Tsantoulis 
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Sea region started a process of reviving their Europe friendly attitude:
63 “In 
this quest for identity, they soon became aware of the need to recreate re-
gional historical entities to replace the faceless post-Communist space to 
which they had been identified. Regional organisations were created to give 
a voice and a face to these aspirations”.
64  
Although, there have been some important regional schemes in the region 
the EU was neither directly involved in the regional cooperation structures 
of the Black Sea region, nor does it want to get directly involved at this 
stage especially in energy and security issues. The countries of Black Sea 
region itself find little stimulus to get serious on regional cooperation in the 
light of the bigger prize – EU membership. Additionally, the principle of 
differentiation is applied by all EU policies, and especially in the ENP, 
which means that the EU deals and will continue to deal with all of these 
countries bilaterally.
65 Of course, this approach finds its justification in the 
practice of the EU to reward countries, which are better applying democ-
racy and market reforms. As a result, the ENP replaces in the eyes of the 
Black Sea region countries the need of regional cooperation and is so far in 
the eyes of the EU a replacement policy for a ‘Black Sea dimension’. 
5.2. ENP as the framework of cooperation?  
Up to now EU’s policies towards the Black Sea region were either ineffec-
tive or absent. However, it seems that the ENP has a very appealing logic. 
The accomplishing of the vast May 2004 enlargement put the EU in an ex-
istential dilemma. Victim of the success of its enlargement policy, the EU 
began experiencing tremendous difficulties in setting the nature and limits 
of its final frontiers. One cynical could say that ENP’s tacit logic is to blur 
the boundary between being “in” and “out” of the EU.  
 
63  Georgiev, op.cit., pp. 30-31. 
64  Di Puppo Lili, “An elixir of youth for regional cooperation in the Black Sea basin”, 
Caucaz.com, 2005. Available at: http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu. 
php?id=201, 11.06.2007. 
65  Di Puppo Lili, “The European Union is feeling its way in the Black Sea”, Caucaz – 
Europe News, 04.11.2005.  Subregionalism in the Black Sea and the EU’s Role 
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Despite the EU’s enthusiasm about the ENP, the target countries of the 
Black Sea region were far from satisfied with this policy. As currently con-
ceived the ENP still does not have a regional concept for the Black Sea re-
gion, in terms of what the Black Sea region represents for the EU. The 
countries from the Black Sea region perceived the ENP as an alternative to 
membership, as a well-ornamented gesture to avoid promises of accession. 
The President of the European Commission, at the time, Romano Prodi 
recommended the EU to give EU’s new neighbours “everything but institu-
tions”. However, ENP offers much less.
66 
Despite its innovations, the ENP is largely inspired from the experience 
and experts of the enlargement policy. The ENP contains strict criteria and 
assessment benchmarks, “sticks” very comparable to those of the enlarge-
ment policy. The asymmetry lies on the side of the “carrots”. Being an 
enlargement candidate, is not only about labelling. It has also serious finan-
cial consequences.
67 The ENP is insufficient as an alternative to member-
ship. Such a large typology of countries inside a single policy framework 
cannot be geared to tackle any pan-European challenges, but only serves 
the internal institutional needs of the EU, not its strategic interests.
68  
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that to some extent at least, the EU’s 
absorption capacity for new members has been stretched, some will say to 
the breaking point. Evidently, over-expanding the EU is the least desirable 
scenario and the effectiveness of the EU to function as union must persist at 
any cost.
69  
It is evident that a weak neighbourhood policy, as the present ENP is per-
ceived to be, is neither a solution. Heavy obligations can be very effective, 
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but not when counter offered by light incentives. In this light it should be 
also mentioned that: first, most of the populations of the Black Sea region 
are in favour of EU membership; secondly, there are reformist leaders in 
the region and thirdly the strength of the Russian factor is indeed present 
although, the EU has shown in the past that the relations with Russia can be 
smoothly managed.  
To put it bluntly, the ENP is the only available tool for the EU to ‘buy 
time’. Maybe, this time is needed by the EU to understand its own needs in 
order to formulate clear objectives and a coherent strategy towards the 
whole Black Sea region. If the EU answers this question, it will also be 
able to answer the question of its final borders. In the meanwhile and at 
least in the short-run, the ENP could be sufficient in extending and project-
ing stability in the wider Black Sea region. At the same time, EU’s interests 
in the region will continue to grow as previously analysed – the EU is cur-
rently just not able to offer more than the ENP to the Black Sea region 
countries
70 and it is true that, for the time being, the EU can offer ENP and 
nothing else.  
6. Drafting a New Strategy 
The first remark is that the EU’s intensified engagement with the Black Sea 
region should be viewed as part of a controlled differentiation. Only 
through differentiated integration will the EU remain capable of further 
widening and deepening. With neighbouring states making increasing de-
mands upon European Union institutions, differentiated integration is likely 
to be the key to ensuring democratic governance and efficiency in a wider 
Europe. This differentiation, if offered to the Union’s neighbours through 
increased participation in EU structures, might provide the incentives for 
genuine reform and cooperation and at the same time avoid new dividing 
lines in Europe.
71 In simple words: all types of privileged partnership but 
not EU membership. 
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The second remark is that, drawing valuable experience from the case of 
the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea should be approached as a single component 
within the wider Europe, putting together into the same basket a number of 
member countries, negotiating and non-negotiating candidate countries, 
partner countries and non-EU countries with and without the intention to 
apply for membership. The main advantage of such a policy-approach is 
that the EU will skip enlargement and post-enlargement dilemmas and even 
more important it will form a grouping of countries where none of them 
will feel excluded from the benefits of further integration with the EU. 
Moreover, the EU itself would not need to decide the border issue once and 
for all, which would leave out some countries permanently. Aydin is right 
when he argues that this way, the EU would keep its most important trump 
card and would be able to continue to push for further reforms and trans-
formation in this fragile region of the world without actually promising fur-
ther membership options.
72 It is what Asmus says “keep the door open, 
even if only in an ambiguous way”
73.  
However, the above mentioned remarks might provide the appropriate 
framework of cooperation with the wider Black Sea region and indeed form 
an ambitious policy approach, but that is not enough. In a way of summing 
up and adding at the same time some guidelines as concluding thoughts, the 
EU’s strategy towards the wider Black Sea region could be a ‘success 
story’ if it includes guidelines such as: 
1.  Sidestepping the membership issue. ‘Keep the door open’ but in a 
rather vague way without promises and timetables that would derail 
any discussion on how to beef up EU’s action in the region. 
2.  Utilising existing regional frameworks of cooperation (BSEC) and 
thus provide the states with a feeling of regional ownership and iden-
tity. Promote the idea of joint projects and when necessary offer a fi-
nancial and political backing. As Roberts points out, a concrete 
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example of potential BSEC-EU cooperation concerns the develop-
ment of a Black Sea Electricity Ring, which would connect all the 
sea’s littoral nations with each other, albeit the difficulties there have 
to be overcome.
74 However, all parties (EU, states of the region, 
BSEC) should bear in mind from the very beginning the limitations 
and the exact role of these regional institutions.
 75 
3.  Providing practical assistance and help in “low politics” issue (trans-
port infrastructure, environmental issues, investments in science and 
technology, know-how in good governance issues) and basically 
concentrate only on a few key areas. Such a rather uncontroversial 
place to start is also related to maritime issues. After showing that 
EU’s presence is concrete and meaningful then the chance for a posi-
tive spill over effect into high politics issues is higher.  
4.  Including at the core of its strategy states such as Bulgaria, Romania 
and Greece while also involving Russia and Turkey. Unlike the 
USA, the EU should not act as an actor that tries to change the bal-
ance of power in a way that promotes its interests but rather in a way 
that promotes mutually beneficial interests. 
5.  Enhancing and clarifying the role and the presence of the two ap-
pointed Special Representatives (Moldova and South Caucasus) in 
the region by giving the chance to the European Union to speak loud 
and clear with a single voice.  
As a last remark, the real question on which all parties should be working is 
not on how the relationship with the EU can be enhanced by an increase in 
the funding for example or how the regional schemes can be improved. The 
most important bet is on how transition, progress and after all ‘Europeani-
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sation’ of the states of the region can be supported, as a goal in its own 
right, perhaps the most important one and perhaps the one that will lead to 
a genuine region-building consensus and thus to a mutually beneficial in-
ter-regional relationship with the EU. After all, the path to greater prosper-
ity for the Black Sea lies in greater integration, both within the region at 
first and then with the rest of the world. 
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